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EMBASSY/CONSULATE ADDRESSES

Diplomatic representation in US:

Chief of Mission: Iran has an Interests Section in the Pakistani Embassy in Washington, DC

Embassy: Iranian Interests Section,
2209 Wisconsin Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20007
Telephone: [1] (202) 965-4990

US diplomatic representation: protecting


Embassy and Consulate Web Sites for Iran
Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Ottawa, Canada
Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in London, Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations in New York


FOREIGN RELATIONS

Following the revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini steered Iran’s foreign policy sharply away from that of the Shah, who was once the U.S.’s strongest ally in the region. In September 1980, during the U.S. hostage crisis, Iraq invaded Iran to prevent the spread of the Islamic Revolution to Iraq’s Shi’a, seize the heavily-Arab province of Khuzestan, and gain control of the Shatt al-Arab, the waterway between the two countries. With the remnants of the Shah’s strong (and U.S.-supplied) military infrastructure and thousands of willing youth volunteers, the Islamic Republic of Iran surprised Iraq with its ability to defend itself. In 1982, Ayatollah Khomeini turned down an Iraqi cease-fire proposal and demanded that Saddam Hussein be removed. After eight punishing years of war, in July 1988 the Islamic Republic of Iran at last agreed to the cease-fire implemented in UN Security Council Resolution 598. Neither nation made any significant territorial gains in the war, although both suffered massive casualties.

Iran's relations with many of its Arab neighbors were strained during the early years of the Islamic Republic because of fears that the Islamic Revolution would spread abroad.

In 1981, Iran supported a plot to overthrow the Bahrain Government and, in 1983, Ayatollah Khomeini expressed support for Shi’a who bombed Western embassies in Kuwait. In 1987, Iranian pilgrims rioted during the hajj (pilgrimage) in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. Iranian officials were involved in both training and assisting Saudi Hizballah operatives in executing the 1996 terrorist bombing of the U.S. military housing facility at Khobar Towers near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, which killed 19 and wounded more than 500 other persons, including 240 U.S. military personnel. Senior IRGC and Qods Force officials were indicted by the Government of Argentina for their alleged roles in the 1994 terrorist bombing of the Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina (the Argentine Israelite Mutual Association or AMIA), which killed 85 people and wounded scores of others.

Since September 2002, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been working to clarify the nature of Iran’s nuclear program. In one of his most detailed reports to the Board of Governors on Iran’s activities, IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei indicated in November 2004 that Iran failed to report, declare, and provide design (or updated design) information on many issues. This included:

  • Six failures to report the import of nuclear material, activities to process/use this material, testing of centrifuges, laser enrichment activities, production of specific nuclear materials, and the irradiation of nuclear materials and subsequent separation of plutonium.
  • Two failures to declare nuclear facilities, including a pilot centrifuge enrichment facility at Kalaye Electric Company, the laser enrichment plant at the Tehran Nuclear Research Center, and a pilot uranium laser enrichment plant at Lashkar Ab’ad.
  • Six failures to provide design information or updated design information for facilities in which nuclear material processing and storage took place.
  • The report also indicated a frequent failure to cooperate to facilitate the implementation of safeguards as evidenced by the extensive concealment activities.

Since November 2004, the IAEA Director General has issued 23 reports on Iran’s implementation of its Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of UN Security Council Resolutions 1737, 1747, 1803, and now 1929. Prior to November 2004, and under international pressure, Iran agreed on November 10, 2003 to suspend all uranium-enrichment and reprocessing activities voluntarily, as well as cooperate fully with the IAEA. Iran then signed the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement on December 18, 2003, and agreed to implement it voluntarily pending ratification, granting IAEA inspectors greater access in verifying the correctness and completeness of Iran’s revised declaration to the IAEA on its nuclear program. Iran terminated its first suspension following inconclusive negotiations with the EU-3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) and disagreements as to the scope of the required suspension, leading to additional negotiations and a second suspension that began in November 2004. This second suspension ended with Iran’s restart of its uranium conversion activities at its facility in Esfahan in August 2005. The IAEA Board found Iran in noncompliance with its Safeguards Agreement in September 2005 and, after Iran restarted uranium enrichment activities at Natanz in January 2006, the Board also reported Iran to the UN Security Council for its noncompliance. In February 2006, Iran ended its voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol.

In response to the IAEA Board’s report of noncompliance, the UN Security Council (UNSC) has adopted a Presidential Statement (S/PRST/2006, March 2006) and six resolutions (UNSCRs) on Iran: UNSCR 1696 (July 2006), UNSCR 1737 (December 2006), UNSCR 1747 (March 2007), UNSCR 1803 (March 2008), UNSCR 1835 (September 2008), and UNSCR 1929 (2010). Four of the five resolutions (UNSCRs 1737, 1747, 1803, and 1929) impose Chapter VII (legally binding) sanctions on Iran.

In June 2006, China, France, Germany, Russia, the United States, and United Kingdom--the P5+1, also known as the EU 3+3--offered Iran a substantial incentives package of economic cooperation and assistance in return for Tehran’s full cooperation with the IAEA and suspension of its uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing activities. The P5+1 presented Iran with a refreshed package of incentives in June 2008, but Iran has yet to respond clearly and positively to this offer, or comply with its UNSC and IAEA obligations. On April 8, 2009, the P5+1 invited Iran to meet with the group to resolve international concerns and rebuild the confidence of the international community. On October 1, 2009, the United States and the P5+1 members met with representatives from Iran in Geneva, Switzerland. During this meeting, the U.S. delegation also held a sidebar meeting with the Iranian delegation during which there was a frank exchange on human rights and the U.S. stressed again the need for Iran to take concrete and practical steps to meet its international nuclear obligations. Under Secretary for Political Affairs William J. Burns led the U.S. delegation both at the P5+1 talks in Geneva in December 2010 as well as in the most recent talks which took place January 21-22, 2011 in Istanbul, Turkey. The U.S. sought to launch a meaningful and practical process to address the core issues with Iran's nuclear program. No resolution was reached during either session.

In late 2009, Iran appealed to the IAEA for fuel assemblies for the Tehran research reactor (TRR), which has operated for decades and produces medical isotopes. The IAEA, with support from the United States, France, and Russia, offered a TRR re-fueling proposal that would utilize Iran’s own available low-enriched uranium (LEU) at the Natanz fuel enrichment plant by sending 1,200 kilograms of the LEU to Russia for further enrichment, fabricating it into fuel, and returning it to Iran for use in this safeguarded reactor. The plan would both provide the TRR with much-needed fuel to continue to produce medical isotopes while also beginning to build international confidence in Iran’s peaceful intent by removing the majority of its LEU stockpile from Iran’s territory. As of June 2010, Iran continued its enrichment activities, now at nearly 20%, according to the IAEA, and had not agreed to this TRR fuel swap deal.

On June 9, 2010, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1929, the fourth legally binding resolution calling on Iran to halt its proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and comply with its NPT, UNSC, and IAEA safeguards obligations. The resolution calls for several actions to restore international confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program. Specifically, UNSCR 1929 requires Iran to comply fully with its IAEA Safeguards Agreement; prohibits Iranian acquisition of interest in any commercial activity relating to uranium, including mining; prohibits certain arms transfers to Iran; prohibits Iran from undertaking any activity related to ballistic missiles; prohibits designated individuals listed in the annex of UNSCR 1929 from traveling to or through the territory of any UN member state and freezes the assets of those entities and individuals; requires all UN member states to freeze the assets on their territories of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC); requires all UN member states to seize and dispose of all items as specified in UNSCRs 1737, 1747, and 1803 which could contribute to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities; requires all UN member states to freeze the assets on their territories of the entities of the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) listed in the annex of UNSCR 1929; calls upon UN member states to prevent the provision of financial services to Iran if there is information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such services or resources could contribute to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities; requires all UN member states to ensure that their nationals exercise vigilance when doing business with entities incorporated in Iran if there are reasonable grounds to believe that such businesses could contribute to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or to the development of a nuclear weapons delivery system; and calls on UN member states to prohibit the opening of new branches, subsidiaries, or representative offices of Iranian banks in their territories or in Iran if there are reasonable grounds to believe that such businesses could contribute to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or to the development of a nuclear weapons delivery system.

Both Iran and Russia believe they have important national interests at stake in developments in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus, particularly regarding energy resources in the Caspian Sea. The U.S. has expressed concern about Russia’s sales of military equipment and technology to Iran and Russian assistance in building a nuclear facility at Bushehr.

Iran spends about 3.3% of its GDP on its military. Iran's armed forces consist of both a national military, which was held over from the Shah's government, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, each with its own ground, naval, and air braches. The Iran-Iraq war took a heavy toll on Iran’s military, which was once the strongest in the region during the Shah’s reign. Iran has since worked to modernize its military, both conventionally and through the development of its ballistic missile and nuclear programs.

U.S.-IRANIAN RELATIONS
On November 4, 1979, Iranian students seized the American Embassy in Tehran, where they held 52 Americans hostage for 444 days. Although it has been claimed that Ayatollah Khomeini did not have prior knowledge of the students’ plans, he gave his full support to them throughout the seizure. The students claimed that they occupied the American Embassy to avert another U.S.-orchestrated coup to restore the Shah to power; suspicions arose after the U.S. admitted the Shah for medical treatment in October 1979.

On April 7, 1980, the United States broke diplomatic relations with Iran, and on April 24, 1981, the Swiss Government assumed representation of U.S. interests in Tehran. Iranian affairs in the United States are represented by the Embassy of Pakistan, in the Iranian Interests Section, in Washington, DC. The Islamic Republic of Iran also has a permanent mission to the United Nations in New York City.

In accordance with the Algiers declaration of January 20, 1981, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal (located in The Hague, Netherlands) was established for the purpose of handling claims of U.S. nationals against Iran and of Iranian nationals against the U.S. However, U.S. interaction with Iran at The Hague solely covers legal matters.

The U.S. Government, by executive orders issued by the President as well as by congressional legislation, prohibits nearly all trade with Iran. Sanctions have been imposed on Iran because of its sponsorship of terrorism, its refusal to comply with IAEA regulations regarding its nuclear program, and its human rights violations. However, these sanctions are meant to target the Iranian Government, not the people of Iran. As a result, there are a number of exemptions allowed by the U.S. Government intended to benefit the Iranian people. The following trade is permitted: licensed exports of U.S. agricultural and medical products to Iran, U.S. donations of articles intended to relieve human suffering in Iran (food, clothing, etc.), gifts valued at $100 or less, and trade in “informational” materials (films, publications, etc.),. Trade restrictions have been temporarily lifted in the past during humanitarian crises, such as the 2003 Bam earthquake, to allow for donations from American citizens and permit U.S.-based non-governmental organizations to assist with the relief and reconstruction efforts. As the sanctions towards Iran have changed throughout time, please visit the website of the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control for a comprehensive overview of legally permitted trade with Iran. (http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/programs/iran/iran.pdf).

Obstacles to improved relations between the U.S. and the Islamic Republic of Iran remain. The U.S. objects to Iran’s sponsorship of terrorism, its nuclear weapons ambitions, and its violations of human rights. The Islamic Republic of Iran still has not recognized Israel’s right to exist and has hindered the Middle East peace process by arming militants, including Hamas, Hizballah, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Although the Islamic Republic of Iran has contributed to positive reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, Tehran has also pursued policies to undermine stability in both countries. Additionally the U.S. Government is concerned with the Islamic Republic of Iran’s recent crackdown on human rights and detainment of civil society actors.

Despite these obstacles, U.S. and Iranian representatives have discussed a number of issues of concern over the years. U.S. and Iranian envoys cooperated during operations against the Taliban in 2001 and during the Bonn Conference in 2002, which established a broad-based government for the Afghan people under President Karzai. In 2007, representatives from the two countries met several times to discuss Iraq.




TRAVEL ADVISORIES

To obtain the latest Travel Advisory Information for Iran check the U.S. State Department Consular Information Sheet.


TRAVEL TIPS

Driving TBA
Currency (IRR) Iranian Rial
Electrical 230 Volts
Telephones Country Code 98, City Code, Tehran 21, Isfahan 31, Tabriz 41



Iran is inexpensive by international standards. A bare minimum budget for cheap hotels, Iranian food and overland transport is US$10 per day. Unless you thrive on discomfort, however, you should double this to around US$20 per day. This will provide you with decent accommodation, better food, transport by first-class bus and shared taxi, and visits to all the important tourist attractions. One unfortunate part of travelling to Iran is the dual-pricing for foreigners. This affects international flights and ferries, where all tickets must be paid for in US dollars; tourist attractions, where foreigners pay up to 15 times as much to enter as Iranians do; and the more expensive hotels, which often charge in US dollars.

There are three ways to change money (preferably US dollars in cash): at the official, and unfavourable, exchange rate at a bank; at the favourable 'street rate' at a legal, though uncommon, money-exchange office; and on the black market, anywhere. Don't bother taking travellers cheques of any denomination or currency unless you absolutely must: you can only exchange them at the Bank Melli branches at the international airport in Tehran and in central Tehran. An increasing number of mid-range hotels (and all top-end places) accept Visa or MasterCard - but certainly not American Express. However, if your Visa or MasterCard has been issued in the US, it may be useless because of the US trade embargo. Bottom line: bring plenty of greenbacks.

In most cases, tipping is an optional reward for good service. Although there are many circumstances where a small tip is expected, you are unlikely to have a waiter hovering expectantly near your table after delivering the bill. On the other hand, it's worth remembering that helpful Iranians probably deserve some extra appreciation to supplement their meagre wages. As for bargaining, in the bazaar virtually all prices are negotiable; in shops, it's a complete waste of time. Fares in private taxis are always negotiable, but not in any other form of transport because these prices are set by the government. Hotel rates are open to negotiation except in top-end places.


CUSTOMS/DUTIES

Tobacco....200 cigarettes or equivalent in tobacco products

Liquor.....prohibited

Perfume....reasonable for personal use

Cameras....should be declared on arrival

Currency...should be declared on arrival

Gifts......import duty/tax do not exceed us$80

Prohibited items.....alcoholic beverages, narcotics, guns and ammunition, aerial photos cameras, transmitter reciever apparatus, vulgar films, unpleasant records, cassettes, videos, indecent photographs or any kind of fashion magazine.

Restricted items.....export of antiques, gold, silver and jewellery. travellers may export only one hand-woven carpet or two rugs (total area not exceeding 12 sq metres).



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